CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: NEGLIGENT SUPPRESSION OF
EVIDENCE AS GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

IN United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp.' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has expanded the scope of the public prosecutor's duty to secure a fair trial to defendants in criminal proceedings.
A new trial was ordered on the finding that material evidence had been
"negligently suppressed."
Consolidated arose as an antitrust prosecution against a number of
linen supply companies in the New York City area. At the trial all the
defendants were found guilty of a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
the linen supply business in violation of sections i and 2 of the Sherman
Act.2 The trial judge, sitting without a jury, relied heavily on the
testimony of one Paul Ullman, the principal prosecution witness, who
testified that his linen supply company had been forced out of business
through the concerted efforts of the defendants. Defendants moved,
pursuant to the Jencks Act,8 for the production of all statements given
to the Government by Ullman which were relevant to his trial testimony. This motion was granted by the trial judge. After the trial it
came to light that the Government had in its possession certain statements by Ullman which had not been produced at the time of the trial
court order. In the motion for a new trial defendants did not dispute
that the Government had produced all the statements which it, in good
faith, thought were in its possession. However, the newly discovered
statements dearly impeached some of the testimony given by Ullman
at the trial, 4 and defendants alleged that they were seriously prejudiced
by denial of the opportunity to use these statements in their crossexamination of Ullman. Upon the district court's denial of a new
trial, defendants took an appeal.
In the past it would have been necessary for the defendants either
to have brought the statements forward as newly discovered evidence,5
1 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. g6i).
226
Stat. 209 (189o), as amended, i5 U.S.C. §§ i, z (1958).

19 U.S.C. § 350 (1958).
"See 291 F.2d at 569-70.
"See Woollomes v. Heinze, 198 F.zd 577 ( 9 th Cir. 1952), where statements by an
eye witness to the crime became available after a trial in which the prosecution had
refused to disclose a list of certain witnesses. The defense charged suppression of evi-
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or to have alleged the willful suppression of evidence. In either event
the defendant would have been left without relief on the facts of this
case.
Traditionally the courts have not favored new trials on the grounds
of newly discovered evidence.6 Therefore, they have developed a rigid
set of requirements which must be satisfied before a new trial will be
granted.' These-requirements have been outlined as follows:
A motion based on newly discovered evidence must disclose (i) that
the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the
time of the trial, (2) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or
impeaching, (3) that it will probably produce an acquittal, and (4)that
failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part
of the defendant.
A new trial, however, should be granted where the newly discovered
evidence, although impeaching, is so conclusive as to destroy the credibility
of a material witness against the defendant.'
The evidence subsequently brought forward in Consolidated was merely
impeaching. Defendants would not have been able to show that the
new evidence would probably produce an acquittal, nor could they
have shown that the evidence would, as a matter of law, destroy the
credibility of Ullman. Thus, as applied to this case, the inadequacy of
the newly discovered evidence motion is obvious.
It is equally obvious that the defendants could not have successfully
alleged the'willful suppression of evidence. Although it is well settled
that courts will consider evidence which was suppressed by the prosecution in a more indulgent light than they will view ordinary newly discovered evidence,9 it is also settled that the evidence must be "knowingly" suppressed.1 0 There was no claim by the defendants that the
prosecution actually knew of the existence of the statements in question.
dence, but the court held that "the afdavits disclose at most newly discovered evidence?,
Id. at 579.

' Orfield, New Trial in Federal Criminal Cases,
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(1957).

'See, e.g., United States v. Rutkin, 712 F.zd 641 (3 d Cir.
v. Berkshire Fabricators Co., 17 F.R.D. 44, 46 (D.R.I. .955).
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United States

BARRON & HoLxzoFF, FEDERAL PRACrICE & PROCEDURE § z2z
(1951).
213 (1942) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 1o (1935);
United States v. Rutkin, 212 F.zd 641 ( 3 d Cir. 1954).
'4

'Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S.

" United States v. Rutkin, supra note 9; Application of Landeros 154 F. Supp. 183,
185 (D.N.J. 1957). See s UTAH L. REv. 92 (1956); 2 VILL. L. REV. 293, 3z6
n.205 (1957).
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Thus the defendants were left without relief within the framework
of established grounds for new trial. However, the Second Circuit,.
regarding the motion as alleging the "negligent suppression of evidence,"' n ordered a new trial. The court did not base its decision.
on a violation of due process, as was suggested by defense counsel,"2 "
the correct administration of criminar
but rather on its duty to supervise
3
courts.'
federal
the
in
justice
Although recognizing that there was "no authoritative case pre-.
cisely in point,' 4 the court cited a number of cases as tending to supportits conclusions.:" In three of the four cases principally relied upon,
however, willful suppression had been alleged.'8 The prosecution.
z' This term seems to have originated with reference to People v. Savvides, r
N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.zd 853, 154 N.Y.S.zd 885 (956), in Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 607 (1957). However, the use of the term as applied to that case is misleadingif it is understood in the sense employed in the instant case. In Savvides a witness for
the prosecution falsely testified that there was no agreement that he was to receivelenient treatment for testifying against the defendant. A new trial was ordered because
the assistant district attorney failed to inform the court that there was such an agreement. It is true that the prosecutor did nothing affirmatively to suppress evidence, but
to say that his failure to speak up was mere negligence is to misjudge the nature of his.
breach. Failure to speak is the only way that matters within his own knowledge couldbe suppressed by the prosecutor. Thus where he knows that his silence will result in
suppression of evidence it would seem that his conduct must be deemed willful.
" Defense counsel also suggested a violation of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1958), but a cursory inspection of that act will reveal that no such situation as thatpresented in the instant case was anticipated, nor is any remedy provided.
"5Federal courts have adopted this basis for decision on a number of occasions when,
they have preferred to avoid the constitutional issue of due process. Jencks v. United"
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) ; United
States v. Heath, z6o F.2d 623 ( 9 th Cir. 1958), dismissing appeal from 147 F. Supp.
877 (D. Hawaii 1957). Inherent in a judicial system is the duty of appellate courts-.
to guarantee to each defendant a fair trial. This duty is seen by the federal courts as
extending beyond the bare requirements of "due process." As was said in McNabb v.
United States, supra at 340, "[Wihile the power of this Court to undo convictions in.
state courts is limited to the enforcement of those 'fundamental principles of liberty and
justice,' . . . which are secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, the scope of ourreviewing power over convictions brought here from the federal courts is not confined
to ascertainment of Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the administrationof criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and main-.
taining civilized standards of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied
merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason:
which are summarized as Cdue process of law' . .. .
It 291 F.zd at 570.
2'Napue v. Illinois, 36o U.S. 264 (1959); Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707
( 3 d Cir. x958); United States v. Heath, 26o F.zd 623 ( 9 th Cir. 1958); United"
States ex -el. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
"Napue v. Illinois, supra note i5 Curran v. Delaware, supra note i5; Unitedl
States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, supra note 15.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. i96z: 131

either knew of,' 7 or was held with knowledge of,18 the existence of the
suppressed evidence and its relevance to the preparation of the defense.
The court in Consolidated seemed to rely more on the language employed in these cases than on the holdings themselves." In the fourth
case, United States v. Heath,2 0 the Ninth Circuit upheld a trial judge's
refusal to allow a case to come to trial when he found that the Government had lost some papers which he considered essential to a fair trial.
But here again there are dearly distinguishing features.21 The most
obvious is that Heath was not an attack upon a concluded trial. It
seems beyond cavil that the problems and policy considerations involved
in laying the ground rules for a particular trial are fundamentally
"Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor failed to correct a witness's
testimony which he knew to be false); Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.zd 707 ( 3 d Cir.
1958) (defendants gave police officers several statements concerning an alleged crime
but the police destroyed all except one statement of each defendant).
"sUnited States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
There the defendant, a Negro, was convicted of raping a white woman. A doctor's
report which would have exculpated the defendant was not brought forward by the
police at the trial. In a habeas corpus proceeding the federal court made a finding
of fact that "[T]he prosecution either knew, or should have known, of Dr. Walter's
examination and report-in fact they are charged with the knowledge." Id. at 390.
"Speaking generally of the prosecutor's duty, the court in United States ex rel.
Montgomery v. Ragen, supra note z8, at 387, said, "It is [the prosecutor's] duty to
bring forward all facts to the Court's and jury's attention so that a true consideration
may be made in the* interest of justice. A prosecutor is supposed to be an impartial
representative of public justice. ... It was and is the prosecuting attorney's duty to

assist in giving a fair trial to a defendant."
Similarly, in Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.zd 707, 711 ( 3 d Cir. 1958), the
court said, "[W]e state that the trial of a capital case, or indeed any other trial,
no longer can be considered properly a game of wits and skill. It is clear that men on
trial for their lives are entitled to all pertinent facts relating to their defense and
that no witness is entitled to constitute himself the judge of what the court shall hear."
I so 26o F.2d 623 ( 9 th Cir. 1958), dismissing appeal from 147 F. Supp. 877 (D.
Hawaii 1957).
"It is important to note the posture in which the Heath case reached the Court of
Appeals. The defendant had obtained an order of dismissal in the trial court and all
that the appellate court did was refuse to reverse the trial judge's exercise of his discretionary power to control the proceedings of a trial. The fact that appellate courts
are reluctant to reverse on matters within the discretion of a trial judge would seem to
lessen the authority of Heath in a subsequent case where defendants are seeking to
have a lower court decision reversed either as an abuse of discretion or for an error of
law.

An appellate court will reverse the denial of a motion for new trial where it finds
an abuse of discretion of an error of law. Orfield, supra note 7 at 345. Inspection
of the reasoning in Consolidated reveals that it' was on the latter ground that the new
trial was ordered.
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different from those where a previously terminated trial is under direct
or collateral attack. 2
In spite of the lack of precedent the court nevertheless granted the
defendants relief, relying on the broad proposition that:
"The prosecutor must be vigilant to see to it that full disclosure is made
at trial of whatever may be in his possession which bears in any material
degree on the charge for which a defendant is tried. In the long run it is
more important that the government disclose the truth so that justice may be
done than that some advantage might accrue to the prosecution toward

ensuring a conviction."23
The Consolidated decision is the outcome of an increasing recognition that criminal prosecutions are no longer genuine adversary proceedings." The prosecutor has become recognized as a public official
with a definite responsibility not only to the general public, but also to
individual defendants. 25 In the past this view has gained judicial recog"An exhaustive treatment of the question touched on at this point is beyond the
scope of this note. It should be noted, however, that when a pre-trial order of dismissal is reviewed a reversal will impose no undue burden on the defendant and no
unnecessary public expense. The ordering of a new trial, on the other hand, works
against the general policy of bringing an end to litigation and multiplies the cost to
the public.
In addition, the appellate court is usually in a poor position to review a lower
court's denial of a motion for new trial, because the trial judge is inevitably much
closer to the case and has a more thorough acquaintance with the record. The same
is not necessarily true where the trial judge has granted a dismissal before the case
has come to trial. In that case it is not likely that the trial judge will be peculiarly
well informed on the subje'ct matter of the appeal and the record is likely to be relatively easy for the appellate court to handle.
" United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 57x (2d Cir.
1961), quoting language from United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 668 (ad
Cir. x959). The Zborowski case, although decided within the limited context of
disclosure of the minutes of grand jury hearings, foreshadowed to a certain extent the
holding in the instant case. It is a practice of the Second Circuit for the trial judge
to make the grand jury minutes available to the defense when he finds an inconsistency
between a witness's grand jury and trial testimony. A new trial was granted in
Zboroivski because the trial judge refused even to read the minutes, but the court
also stated that "the government should not have stood mute.'
Id. at 667. It was
pointed out that the Government was in a much better position than was the trial
judge to know the contents of the grand jury minutes and should have made the
relevant parts available to the defense. However, the case gives no indication whether
this obligation was more than a moral one.
" "I[T]he trial of a capital case, or indeed any other trial, no longer can be considered properly a game of wits and skill." Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 711
( 3 d Cir. x958). See 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 607 (1957).
25 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. 111. 1949).
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nition primarily in cases where the prosecutor has willfully suppressed
evidence , has knowingly used perjured testimony, 7 or has indulged
in unconscionable conduct during the course of the trial.2 , Thus the
courts have thought of the prosecutor's duty as a negative one-to
refrain from conduct which would prejudice the defendant's case. On
the other hand, the disclosure of exculpatory evidence has been thought
-of, at most, as a moral obligation.2 9 The impact of Consolidated is to
impose on the prosecutor an affirmative duty to "keep the evidence of
which it [is] custodian in such manner that it [will] be available for use
upon the trial by all parties.""I
As yet the decision in Consolidated has but a limited application.
The court seemed to require a clear showing of prejudice.-' This may
mean that in practice courts will be more reluctant to grant new trials
where negligent suppression of evidence has been alleged than they
have been when faced with an allegation of willful suppression.3 2 Furthermore, since the constitutional issue was not decided, there is no
direct effect on state court proceedings. Whether the Second Circuit
would find a violation of due process if the same facts were presented
in a collateral attack on a state court proceeding is a matter of speculation.
Although Consolidated seems to lay down a broad rule for the
conduct of public prosecutors, it must be born in mind that this case
actually involved only the failure of the prosecutor to produce stafe"Napue

v. Illinois, 36o U.S. 264 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 3t7 U.S. 213 (1942);

Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.zd 707 ( 3 d Cir. 1958); United States v. Rutkin, 212
F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1954).
"Pyle v. Kansas, supra note 26; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935);
United States v. Rutkin, supra note 26.
"8 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
For a collection of state court
cases, see 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 607, 609 n.i9 (1957).
"8 "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict,
but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses

capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible."

Canons

of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association, Canon 5 (1937). For a general discussion of disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and for recent developments indicating change in this area, see Note, 60 COLUM. L. Rs-v. 858 (196o).
30291 F.2d

"1See

291

at 570.
F.2d at 469-70 where the court discusses at some length the usefulness

of the suppressed statements. Prejudice is ordinarily presumed where the prosecution
has knowingly used perjured testimony or has willfully suppressed evidence. See 32
N.Y.U.L. REv. 607, 611 (1957).
"' Compare United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (zd Cir.
i96a)
zatA Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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ments pursuant to a court order. This means, of course, that it will be
possible for other federal courts to restrict further application of the

holding. However, if the language of the court is taken at face value
it would appear that the judicial conception of the prosecutor's duty
33
toward defendants will undergo further revision.

3 The

discovery process in criminal procedure has come under attack by many

defense lawyers as being far less than adequate. See generally Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74. HARV. L. REV. 942, iosi-63 (1961). This group will welcome
Consolidated as a step toward alleviating the shortcomings of criminal discovery.
Prosecutors, on the other hand, tend to feel that they are experiencing increasing
,difficulty in securing convictions. Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society:
A Plea for Modernization, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 395, 397 (i96o). They may see
.this holding as making available to guilty parties additional methods of thwarting
the expeditious administration of the criminal law.

